AI Index Report

Five editions, five years, one trend line

The AI Index is an independent Stanford HAI initiative that has tracked artificial intelligence since 2017 — across research, technical performance, responsible AI, the economy, science and medicine, policy, education and public opinion. This site holds five editions, covering calendar years 2021 through 2025. Reading them together shows two things no single edition can: the rate of change, and the places where the Index has since revised what it said. A few numbers that set the scene:

5calendar years covered, 2021 through 2025
88% of organizations using AI in 2025 (50% in 2022)
129.9% growth in global corporate AI investment, 2024 → 2025
362AI incidents logged in 2025 (149 in 2023)
191.4US$ millions to train Gemini Ultra in 2023 — the 2017 Transformer cost under $1,000
39chapters across the five editions — the structure changes every year

Pick an edition

Each edition is a complete site of its own — an overview page plus one deep dive per chapter, in English and Traditional Chinese.

The same chapter has five different numbers

Where each subject sits in each edition. Only the first four rows hold still; everything below them moves, appears or disappears. This is why a citation like 'Chapter 6' means nothing without the edition attached.

Subject20222023202420252026
Research & Development11111
Technical Performance22222
AI Ethics → Responsible AI33333
Economy44444
Education45677
Science & Medicineno such chapter in the 2022 editionno such chapter in the 2023 edition555 + 6
Policy & Governance56768
Diversityno such chapter in the 2022 edition78dropped from the 2025 editiondropped from the 2026 edition
Public Opinionno such chapter in the 2022 edition8989
Highlighted cells mark the edition where something changed: the economy and education shared chapter 4 in 2022, chapter 3 was renamed from Technical AI Ethics to Responsible AI in 2024, and science and medicine split into two chapters in 2026.

How the chapters split, merged and vanished

The table above shows where each subject landed. This shows how it got there — one chapter became two, two became one, one was renamed, and one was quietly dropped.

The diagram is drawn in the browser from the text description above it, which is also what a reader without JavaScript sees.

A peak, a two-year trough, then a doubling

Global AI investment in billions of US dollars. Corporate investment is the broadest measure — private investment, mergers and acquisitions, minority stakes and public offerings together; private investment is the venture and private-equity slice inside it.

A peak, a two-year trough, then a doubling015030045060020212022202320242025581.69344.66
  • Corporate (all four kinds)
  • Private investment only
Both lines are read from the 2026 edition's own back-series, not assembled from what each edition said at the time. Two values are printed with fewer decimals than the rest, and both are copied exactly as the source has them: the 2023 corporate total is a whole number (201), and the 2021 private figure carries one decimal (145.4).

The same year, reported twice, years apart

Global corporate AI investment, in billions of US dollars. Switch between what the edition of the day printed and what the 2026 edition now says about those same years. Both views share one scale, so the bars are directly comparable.

The same year, reported twice, years apart201966.982020119.542021176.472022189.592023189.16

Each bar is the figure printed by the earliest edition on this site that covered that year: 2019–2021 from the 2022 edition, 2022 from the 2023 edition, 2023 from the 2024 edition.

Every edition's figure for every year

Global corporate AI investment, US$ billions. Read a row across and you are watching one year get rewritten. The data provider says why: it keeps widening the set of companies it tracks, so each edition looks further back with a bigger net.

Year measured2022 ed.2023 ed.2024 ed.2025 ed.2026 ed.
201429.1719.0419.0419.0419.04
201966.9895.57103.27103.27103.27
2020119.54146.74202.49221.87221.87
2021176.47276.14337.40360.73360.73
2022the 2022 edition predates this year189.59234.95253.25253.25
2023not yet coverednot yet covered189.16201201
2024not yet coverednot yet coverednot yet covered252.33253.02
2025not yet coverednot yet coverednot yet coverednot yet covered581.69
Newly funded AI companies were revised harder still: 2021 was 746 companies in the 2022 edition and 1,669 in the 2023 edition — 2.24 times as many. Figures settle once an edition or two has passed; everything from 2013 to 2023 is now identical in the 2025 and 2026 editions.

Organizations moved first; the public warmed slowly

Percentages. Organizational adoption sat flat for years and then stepped up 23 points in a single year, while the share of people saying AI's benefits outweigh its drawbacks crept up a few points at a time — and the American figure has never caught the global one.

Organizations moved first; the public warmed slowly022.54567.59020212022202320242025885942
  • Organizations using AI
  • Benefits outweigh drawbacks — global
  • Benefits outweigh drawbacks — US
Every point is corroborated by at least two editions except the 2025 values, which only the 2026 edition has reported; the 2022 global figure of 52% appears identically in four separate editions. Two caveats the corroboration does not cover. The adoption question changed in the 2025 edition — from organizations that have “adopted” AI to those that “use” it, with the section inside the Economy chapter retitled from Industry Adoption to Industry Usage, the chapter itself having been Economy throughout — and the 23-point jump falls in exactly that year. And the 2025 US sentiment figure is derived: the 2026 edition prints only a point change against 2022, from which 42% follows.

Incidents kept climbing; US rulemaking levelled off

Counts. Both lines measure things that are counted rather than estimated, which makes them unusually comparable — but they are not the same kind of count, and the gap between them is the point.

Incidents kept climbing; US rulemaking levelled off010020030040020232024202536258
  • AI incidents logged
  • New US federal AI regulations
Every value here is one the reports print. Incidents: 233 for 2024 appears in both the 2025 and 2026 editions, and that agreement is what licenses joining them; 149 for 2023 follows from the 2025 edition's own “56.4% increase over 2023” applied to that 233; 362 is the 2026 edition's. The line starts at 2023 rather than 2022 because the only source for 2022 is the 2024 edition — and that edition puts 2023 at 123, which the 2025 edition contradicts with 149. An edition that disagrees at the overlap cannot be chained here. The 2026 edition says as much itself: AIID totals are “continually updated, including for previous years.” Regulations: 25 and 59 are the 2025 edition's chart labels, 58 the 2026 edition's. Both editions describe the identical method — a keyword search for “artificial intelligence” on the Federal Register, over 436 agencies — which is why this is the one line here whose definition never moved.

What it cost to train the model of the year

AI Index estimates of the compute used to train notable models, in US dollars. Six years separate the Transformer from Gemini Ultra, the most expensive model here, and across them the bill grows by a factor of about 200,000. The last two rows are where the curve bends back.

ModelReleasedEstimated compute costEstimated by
Transformer2017$9302024 edition
RoBERTa Large2019$160,0182024 edition
Chinchilla2022$2.11m2023 edition
GPT-42023$78.4m2024 edition
Gemini Ultra2023$191.4m2024 edition
Llama 3.1-405B2024$170m2025 edition
DeepSeek-V32024$6m2025 edition, developer figure
The last row is the exception that makes the column worth reading: DeepSeek-V3's $6 million is the developer's own number rather than an Index estimate, and the 2025 edition flags it as disputed. Costs on this scale are estimates of compute alone — no salaries, no data acquisition, and none of the failed runs that came before. The estimates get revised like everything else here, and the estimator changed: the 2023 edition used the Index's own figures, the 2024 and 2025 editions use Epoch AI. GPT-3 went from $1.80m to $4.32m, PaLM 540B from $8.01m to $12.39m, and Megatron-Turing NLG down from $11.35m to $6.41m. The Transformer's own revision is a different and more unsettling kind: $930 in the 2024 edition became $670 in the 2025 edition, with Epoch AI on both sides — the same estimator changing its mind, with no change of method left to explain it. The 2026 edition stopped publishing dollar costs altogether, which is why this table ends where it does.

One line per edition

What each edition found when it looked at its year.

  1. 2021 · 2022 edition

    The money doubled; the recipients did not

    Private AI investment reached about $93.5 billion, more than double 2020, while the count of newly funded AI companies fell for a third straight year and rounds of $500 million or more went from four to fifteen.

  2. 2022 · 2023 edition

    Generative AI arrived and investment fell

    DALL·E 2, Stable Diffusion and ChatGPT put AI in front of everyone, and in the same year private investment fell year over year for the first time in a decade. Traditional benchmarks began saturating.

  3. 2023 · 2024 edition

    The frontier passed $100 million

    Overall private investment fell for a second year while generative AI funding nearly octupled to $25.2 billion. Gemini Ultra's training compute was estimated at $191 million. Responsible-AI evaluation was found to have no shared standard at all.

  4. 2024 · 2025 edition

    Benchmarks stopped holding

    Benchmarks introduced barely a year earlier were largely solved, inference cost for GPT-3.5-level performance fell more than 280-fold in eighteen months, and organizational adoption jumped from 55% to 78%.

  5. 2025 · 2026 edition

    Scaling outran everything around it

    Corporate investment more than doubled to $581.7 billion and adoption reached 88%, while documented incidents rose to 362 and the US–China gap at the technical frontier effectively closed.

How to read this site

Four things worth knowing before you compare anything across editions.

An edition is named for the year it is published, not the year it measures

The 2022 edition reports on calendar year 2021; the 2026 edition reports on 2025. This trips people up constantly when comparing figures across sources, so every chart on this site labels the measured year rather than the edition.

The chapter structure changes almost every year

The five editions here have five, eight, nine, eight and nine chapters respectively. The chapter map above shows where each subject sits in each edition, and the diagram below it shows how one chapter became two, two became one, one was renamed and one was dropped. Chapter numbers do not line up across editions — follow the names, not the numbers.

The Index revises its own history

This is the one that catches people out, because nothing in a single edition hints at it. Global corporate AI investment for 2021 was printed as $176.5 billion in the 2022 edition and is now stated as $360.7 billion — 104% higher for the same year. The data provider explains why: it keeps widening the set of companies it tracks, so each edition looks back at the same years with a bigger net. Revisions are not all upward — 2014 was cut from $29.2 billion to $19.0 billion — and they settle after an edition or two.

So every multi-year line on this page is drawn from one edition's own back-series, or from years where the overlapping editions agree. None of them is assembled by taking each edition's figure for its own year, which is the natural thing to do and produces a shape the data does not have.

A metric can quietly change what it counts

Incident counts up to the 2023 edition come from the AIAAIC database; from the 2024 edition onward they come from the AI Incident Database. Chaining the two would draw a line falling from 260 incidents in 2021 to 123 in 2023 — an artifact of the switch, not something that happened. Two more in the same family:

  • Global AI laws passed: the country coverage changed in every single edition — 25 countries, then 127, then 128, then down to 114, and finally to the G20 alone on a different data source. The 2026 edition states it outright: its numbers “may differ from what was reported in the 2025 AI Index report, as the methodology has changed.” The raw counts are not a time series at all.
  • Legislative mentions of AI: coverage shrank from 81 countries to about 75, and the 2026 edition dropped the metric entirely, replacing it with a US-only proxy.
  • US federal AI regulations: the one metric on this page whose definition never moved, which is why it is the one drawn beside incident counts above.

This is a reformatting, not the report

Everything here is drawn from the reports' own top takeaways, per-chapter highlights and figures, restructured for reading on screen. Nothing is inferred, extrapolated or supplemented from other sources. Where a figure matters, go to the original — each edition links straight to it.

Read the original reports

The AI Index is published open access by the Stanford Institute for Human-Centered AI under CC BY-ND 4.0. Full PDFs, the underlying raw data, and the Global AI Vibrancy tool are all available there.

Stanford HAI · AI Index